Means to an End
The framing of gender and sexuality by online followers of two radical right parties in the Netherlands

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1. Introduction

The political claims of the radical right in the Netherlands, as in other European countries, are mainly characterized by a clear statement against immigration from non-western countries and an ‘exclusionist, ethno-nationalist notion of citizenship’ (Muis & Immerzeel, 2017). However, less is known about the claims of the radical right on issues of gender and sexuality (i.e. feminism, gender diversity and sexual diversity).

Gay rights and the emancipation of women are often employed by populist radical right parties such as the PVV (Party for Freedom) as a characteristic element of national identity—one that is not, or not enough acknowledged by Dutch citizens with an Islamic and/or non-Western migration background. For instance, during the Dutch general debate of 2016, PVV leader Geert Wilders of PVV stated: “[…] if we let millions of people enter our country from different cultures, people who hate our way of life, people who find it horrible if woman wear short skirts, people who don’t want gays to walk hand in hand, if we don’t do something about it, the Netherlands will disappear, then we will lose our country”.

Thus, you could say Geert Wilders is framing immigrants (from non-Western countries) as a threat for gay rights and woman’s emancipation—values that are therefore in need of defense. In the same sentence, gay-sexuality and women’s emancipation are appropriated as ‘Dutch’, while (non-Western) immigrants become the dangerous and deviant ‘other’, aversive towards these ‘Dutch’ values.

Some authors have emphasized that issues related to gender and sexuality seem mainly a rhetorical devise for populist radical right parties, since these ideas are either absent, not dominant or inconsistent with actual policy (Akkerman, 2015; Meret & Siim, 2012). Therefore, the question rises whether statements like the one mentioned above are actually about gender and sexuality issues? Or are these issues solely devises or tools that enable a discrimination between, for example, ‘Dutch’ and ‘non-Dutch’? Hence, a better understanding of the role of gender & sexuality issues in radical right claims is necessary. In this respect, we know the content of the political claims of Wilders, but what about his followers? How do they think and talk about gender and sexuality?

This study will address these questions by focussing on the way issues of gender and sexuality are framed on the Facebook pages of two prominent Dutch radical right parties: PVV (Party for Freedom) and Forum for Democracy (FvD). More specifically: I will look at the claims of online followers of PVV and FvD, as expressed in comments on both party-pages.

These online followers are not voters for these parties per se, and cannot be addressed as supporters automatically. However, I will assume that the majority of online followers on Facebook is sympathetic to the party and/or its ideas. In this regard, a recent study showed that 67% of
online supporters of populist radical right groups in Europe, also voted for a PRR party (Bartlett, Birdwell, & Littler, 2011). On the other hand, other followers of these Facebook pages can be opposed to the party and its ideas. Therefore, this approach will not only shed light on whether and how gender and sexuality is embedded in claims of online followers that support the radical right, but also on whether and how this yields critique in opposing claims.

1.1 What we know

Since the topic of gender and sexuality and radical right politics is in the interdisciplinary field of gender studies, political science and political sociology, the link between gender and radical right politics is highly under-researched and not addressed extensively up until recently.

Nevertheless, some important studies address the topic of gender and populist radical right (PRR) parties. Most of these studies focus on the ‘supply’ side, meaning ideology and leadership of PRR parties in regard to gender issues (Akkerman & Hagelund, 2007; Mepschen et al., 2010; Bracke, 2012; Meret & Siim, 2012; Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2015; Akkerman, 2015; Lange & Mügge, 2015; Meret, 2015). Only a few studies focus on the ‘demand’ side, meaning attitudes about gender and sexuality of the supporters of PRR parties (Harteveld et al., 2015; Spierings and Zaslove; 2015). Some of these studies investigate the discourse of PRR parties regarding gender issues, with official and/or unofficial party documentation as the main source of data (Meret & Siim, 2012; Lange & Mügge, 2015; Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2015), therefore limiting the study to the party leadership of one or multiple PRR parties.

What do these studies reveal about gender & sexuality and the radical right? First of all, it seems that populist radical right parties in the Netherlands employ a civilized-backward discourse, in which ‘liberal’ ideas on gay-rights and the emancipation of women are connected to anti-Islam and/or anti-immigration sentiments (Lange & Mügge, 2015; Mepschen et al., 2010). This is what Spierings & Zaslov (2017) call a ‘liberal’ Islam/immigration critique.

1.2 What is missing

This study will contribute to the literature in three ways: (1) while earlier studies mainly focussed on positions and discourses of party leadership, and on radical right voters in an offline context, I will examine online followers of PRR parties; (2) while studies up until now only focused on PVV, I will make a comparison with the other PRR party in the Netherlands: FvD; (3) while many studies only focused on some specific gender and sexuality issues, I will investigate the wider scope of issues related to gender and sexuality.
First, there are good reasons to focus on online followers of these PRR parties. In the growing political realm online, on social network sites such as Facebook (Bode et al., 2014), also online followers of radical right parties have the opportunity to express their political views and opinions. As a consequence, online realms of the radical right, in which online followers communicate with radical right parties and movements and with each other, have flourished in recent years. Although the exact relation between online claims and offline involvement is difficult to determine, online claims and discussions are a valuable source of data and object of study since they constitute a reality in their own right (Muis, Klein & Dijkstra, N.D.). As such, this opens up many possibilities for the research of radical right online groups, such as the analysis of discussions within groups, and comparative approaches focusing on differences between groups (Ibid.). In addition, the focus on online realms of the radical right and the claims being made there is important since, as Muis et al. (N.D.) point out, ‘online radicalisation could affect people's perceptions, and thereby people's behaviour offline, such as the party they vote for and their face-to-face contacts with ethnic minorities’. Hence, for these reasons, I will look at (political) claims of online followers of radical right parties in the Netherlands, in order to see how gender and sexuality issues are discussed in practice on social media. This approach will be a valuable addition to the growing but still limited body of knowledge on gender & sexuality and the radical right.

In respect to party leadership and supporters, one study reveals a discrepancy between the position of PRR parties—that express pro-gay ideas—and the lack of support for pro-gay attitudes among voters in the Netherlands (Spierings & Zaslov, 2015). Although voters of radical right parties are not equal to online followers, based on these results there is reason to believe online followers might differ from party leadership in terms of whether and how issues of gender and sexuality are discussed.

Second, little is known about the ways in which other topics related to gender & sexuality—such as transgenderism, more diverse gender identities and gender neutrality—are discussed by radical right parties and their online followers. For example, Spierings (2017b) suggests PRR parties are framing more diverse gender identities and gender neutrality as ‘against the will of common people’ and ‘against the natural order’. In this respect, a more systematic analysis is needed.

Third, although the PVV is addressed in the literature (Akkerman, 2015; Lange & Mügge, 2015), the younger party, FvD, is not discussed or analyzed up until now. To what extent is the framing regarding gender & sexuality by online followers of these parties comparable? Since the national political and cultural context is shaping discourses, one might expect similarities. However, also the specific ideological position of a party can influence the way the issues under study are framed, and which type of discourses are activated.
Hence, the main goal of this research project is to analyze the role of issues regarding gender & sexuality—i.e. feminist values such as gender equality, but also gender-diversity and sexual diversity—in the (political) claims of online followers of two radical right parties in the Netherlands: PVV and FvD.

In order to accomplish this goal, I will answer two research questions: (1) To what extent are topics regarding gender & sexuality present in the political claims of online followers of PVV and FvD on Facebook? (2) How are issues regarding gender & sexuality framed in the (political) claims of online followers of PVV and FvD on Facebook, and what are differences and/or similarities in this respect between (a) online followers of both parties, and (b) specific issues within the broad category of ‘gender and sexuality’?

1.3 Societal relevance

In recent years, with the increasing dominance of new radical right parties, nationalistic, xenophobic and racist rhetoric is becoming more normalized in public debate, according to Wodak (2015). In line with this observation, Wagenaar (2017) concludes in the Dutch context, that the decline of societal resistance against radical right organizations is a long-term trend. More often than before, involvement of radical right organizations in local protests are tolerated or even acclaimed.

According to Vieten (2016, p. 631), gender issues ‘play a prominent role in the normalisation of far right discourses’, as they are employed as a cultural marker to discriminate between majority and minority groups by many radical right parties and movements in the Netherlands, as shown by the quote of Geert Wilders mentioned earlier. On the other hand, as some influential radical right groups, such as the ones affiliated with the Alt-Right, hold conservative or even hostile ideas on gender & sexuality (Hawley, 2017; Nagle, 2017), also these ideas can reach the mainstream.

Hence, analyses of the nature and function of issues regarding gender & sexuality in radical right claims are important in order to understand these developments.
2. Theoretical framework

In this chapter, I will firstly define ‘radical right’, outline the renewal of right-wing radicalism and how it relates to gender & sexuality. Secondly, I will explain the concept of **framing**. Lastly, I will outline two dominant radical right discourses regarding gender & sexuality, and provide examples of specific ways in which the two radical right parties in the Netherlands are framing gender & sexuality issues.

2.1 The Radical Right: a conceptual framework

In the literature, many terms are used to indicate ideologies, party-families and movements in the political right-wing spectrum. I will use Minkenberg’s (2000) definition of ‘radical right’ that is tied to theories of social change, in particular modernization theories, since these underlie most analysis and definitions of right-wing radicalism. Moreover, this definition of right-wing radicalism incorporates the fundamental transformation it underwent since the late 20th century, which is especially relevant in relation to the link with gender & sexuality.

2.1.1 In opposition to postmodernity

The radical right must be viewed in the context of fundamental changes in the political landscape of Western-Europe in which a new ‘conflict axis’ (Minkenberg, 1992) between the New Left and New (radical) Right changed the ideology and constituencies of left and right politics (Inglehart, 1997). As the right-wing pole of this new conflict axis, Minkenberg (2000, p. 174) defines the contemporary radical right as ‘a political ideology, the core element of which is a myth of a homogeneous nation, a romantic and populist ultranationalism which is directed against the concept of liberal and pluralistic democracy and its underlying principles of individualism and universalism’. As such, the radical right is often interpreted as a ‘cultural backlash’ (Inglehart & Norris, 2016) against the effects and underlying principles of postmodernization (Minkenberg, 2000), which points to a broad set of progressive cultural changes related to multiculturalism, gender & sexuality and globalization. Inglehart & Norris (2016, p.14) argue that more traditional values that were dominant in earlier epochs, values that are most important to the older generation, less educated sectors and men, ‘became out of step with the changing cultures of contemporary Western societies, with this displacement generating resentment, anger, and a sense of loss’.
2.1.4 Gender, sexuality and the cultural backlash

Within the broader set of progressive cultural changes, progressive opinions regarding gender & sexuality is an important factor. Perhaps one of the most significant changes in this respect is the decreasing importance of patriarchal values of fixed gender roles and the increasing emphasis on progressive, feminist values of gender equality in all domains of social life, including the family, work, education and politics (Inglehart & Norris, 2016). Therefore, it is arguable that this ‘cultural backlash’ and the resentment, anger and sense of loss that it entails, not only focuses on immigration and multiculturalism, but also on other facets of progressive cultural change. For example, the particular set of progressive cultural changes that I refer to as ‘gender and sexuality’: diverse forms of sexuality, LGBT-rights, same-sex marriage and varied family units, more diverse gender identities and feminist values such as gender equality (Ibid.).

In this line of thought, feminist scholars described a backlash against feminism and feminist values (McRobbie, 2004). In the Dutch context, this conservative backlash against feminism is rather complicated, as it also bears progressive, postmodern elements. As Oudenampsen (2018) explains: certain aspects of gender equality and emancipation are accepted, in order to reject the broader claims of the feminist movement as defunct—which is strategically achieved by claiming ‘gender equality is achieved’, and ‘feminism is a finished project’. This way, feminism ‘transformed into a form of Gramscian common sense, while also fiercely repudiated, indeed almost hated’(McRobbie, 2004, p. 256).

2.2 Radical right frames on gender & sexuality

Before I will outline two dominant radical right rationales regarding gender & sexuality in the Netherlands, it is important to define the concept of framing.

2.2.2 A definition of framing

The frame concept, originally introduced by Goffman (1974), is embedded in the symbolic interactionist tradition. Goffman’s work revolves around the idea that the meaning and coherence of a social scenes is not given or natural, but often problematic. Therefore, the definition of social situations by individual actors is essential and occurs through processes of interaction, interpretation and contextualization (Vliegenthart & van Zoonen, 2011). In these processes, Goffman (1974, p. 21) sees frames as essential ‘schemata of interpretation’ that render a social scene meaningful.

However, other authors defined ‘frame’ in a slightly different manner. For example, Entman’s (1993, p. 52) influential definition states: ‘to frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular
In this definition of the concept, an assignable actor is framing, implying it denotes an action. Moreover, the act of ‘framing’ is an intentional process, thus, it becomes ‘a tool employed to promote a particular version of reality’ (Vliegenthart & van Zoonen, 2011, p. 107). As Lindekilde (2014, p. 200) explains metaphorically: the act of framing functions ‘like a picture frame that accentuates certain things, hides others, and borders off reality in a certain way’.

In social movement studies, the work of Benford and Snow (2000) has been pivotal. They also emphasize the agency and creativity of individual actors in their interpretation of the frame concept. However, in order to attain impact, they argue, individual frames must be linked in uniformity, which they call ‘frame alignment’. This interpretation of framing corresponds with Goffman’s (1974) interactionist notion of the concept (Vliegenthart & van Zoonen, 2011). The idea of frame alignment acknowledges that framing is also a collective process; that frames come into being through interaction and contextualization and rely on a larger body of knowledge, or discourse. In a similar fashion, Linkilde (2014, p. 201) defines framing as ‘a strategic attempt to guide the activation of particular discourses and repertoires of understanding with the purpose of mobilizing consensus’.

To summarize: in this study, framing is the deliberate and strategic action by assignable actors of selecting specific aspects of a perceived reality in order to promote a particular definition or interpretation (Entman, 1993), and to mobilize consensus (Linkilde, 2014), which is possible through frame alignment (Benford & Snow, 2000). Hence, the act of framing relies on existing ‘schemata’s of interpretation’ (Goffman, 1974), or frames, and attempts to reshape or replace them. Framing relies furthermore on the activation of a larger body of knowledge, or discourse.

Hence, in order to understand specific ways in which the radical right is framing issues regarding gender & sexuality, it is important to describe dominant discourses or ‘repertoires of understanding’ on which these framing practices rely.

### 2.2.3 Two rationales on gender & sexuality

Radical right discourses regarding gender & sexuality can be shaped by multiple factors, such as social or cultural changes, political or cultural context (Meret & Siim, 2012), the impact of particular events (Lange & Mügge, 2015), the ideological position of specific groups, but also the distinctive online culture of the radical right (Nagle, 2017; Maly, 2018). Despite the discursive variations these shaping factors imply, there seem to be two dominant rationales concerning gender and sexuality in radical right discourses. The first rationale fundamentally opposes progressive or postmodern changes related to gender and sexuality, while the latter, in line with the cultural backlash against feminism as described by McRobbie (2006) and Oudenampsen (2018),
incorporates (some aspects of) women's emancipation and gay rights, in order to attack the broader set of postmodern changes, both related to gender & sexuality and multiculturalism. Let us discuss both.

2.2.4 The conservative-progressive discourse

On the one hand, there is a set of ideas related to traditional patriarchy that, according to Wodak (2017), have always been connected to the exclusionary and nativist belief system. However, the cultural backlash (Inglehart & Norris, 2016), as outlined earlier, might catalyze a revival of conservative ideas on gender and sexuality in the new radical right milieux. Even more so since in the online culture of the radial right, and more explicitly that of the Alt-Right, these ideas are recycled and revalued once more, giving them a young élan (Nagle, 2017). Prominent examples in this regard are anti-feminist, male separatist (e.g. Men Go Their Own Way) and misogynist (e.g. the Incels) online groups that oppose progressive notions of gender equality. But also prominent figures such as Jordan Peterson, with many online and offline sympathizers, who propagates a natural difference between men and women and explicitly defends patriarchy.

Thus, this set of ideas can be summarized as a conservative-progressive discourse in which progressive values relating to gender and sexuality are opposed by activating patriarchal, conservative ideas on these issues.

In line with the conservative-progressive discourse, Spierings (2017b) suggests that populist radical right (PRR) parties in the Netherlands are critical towards particular gender issues—i.e. more diverse gender identities and gender-neutrality. He observes that these issues are framed as against the will of ‘common people’ and the natural order. Thus, the current situation is presented as the norm that deserves acclamation, but further acceptance of gender diversity is unwanted and framed as the will of the elite and a small ‘minority’, imposing their will on the ‘majority’ (Ibid., 2017b, p. 509).

2.2.5 The civilized-backward discourse

On the other hand, some issues of gender & sexuality, namely the emancipation of woman and gay rights, are embedded in a specific civilized-backward discourse. In this discourse, woman's emancipation and gay rights become crucial markers of ‘civilized modernity’, employed as ‘easy tools’ to criticize the ‘traditionalism’ of Islam, and multiculturalism more generally (Bracke, 2012, p. 243; Mepschen et al., 2010). The civilized-backward discourse is also in line with the theoretical perspective of a cultural backlash or counter revolt, in the sense that it is also directed at postmodern changes, in particular related to multiculturalism and immigration. However, in respect to gay rights and woman's emancipation, fundamentally different ideas are activated that
represent these issues not as postmodern changes that must be opposed, but as modern (or ‘Western’) values that must be conserved and protected against supposed threats from ‘outside’.

Because this discourse is especially dominant in the Netherlands, which is the focus of this study, I will discuss this specific discourse more in-depth.

Mepschen, Duyvendak en Tonkens (2010), point to multiple developments that contributed to the incorporation of gay rights in the civilized-backward discourse.

Firstly: the ‘culturalization of citizenship’, which denotes the process in which culture and moral values have increasingly become determinative of citizenship and integration policy. In this process, a ‘temporal narrative’ developed in which European ‘modernity’ is opposed to the ‘tradition’ of Islam, and in which sexual freedom became characteristic of a secularized and modern Europe (Ibid., p. 964). As Puar (2013, p. 337) emphasizes, discourses on gay and lesbian liberal rights produce ‘narratives of progress and modernity’ that are employed to legitimize a selective notion of citizenship.

Secondly, Mepschen et al. (2010) describe specific developments in the Dutch context. In the light of the fast secularization and ‘de-pillarization’ since the 1960s, Islamic conservatism reminds of the Christian conservatism from which the Netherlands was only recently ‘freed’. This might explain certain ‘nostalgic sentiments’, as described by Bracke (2012, p. 245), ‘longing for a time when gay liberation could, allegedly, be taken for granted, that is, before it was under threat by Islam’. Furthermore, the same period marked a break from moral traditionalism and introduced more sexual freedom—values that shaped policy and were endorsed by large parts of the population, resulting in a ‘normalization’ of gay sexuality (Mepschen et al., 2010). Therefore, this period has seen the development of ‘a tight knot between secularism and hegemonic conceptions of gay identity and gay rights’ (Bracke, 2012, p. 249).

In addition, Bracke (2012) point to the fact that not only gay rights, but also gender equality and the emancipation of women are employed in a civilized-backward discourse—a discursive relationship that can be traces back to colonial times. According to Bracke (2012), feminism and woman’s emancipation have been embedded in *rescue narratives* that were instrumental in the representation of imperial projects as ‘civilizing missions’. In these narratives, ‘other women’—i.e. colonized women—were in need of salvation by the Dutch woman’s movement in particular, and by ‘civilization’ in general.

Similar rescue narratives can be observed in regard to Muslim woman, according to Bracke (2012). Based on the assumption that the Muslim women are a ‘victim’ of their culture, and wish to adopt Western values, rescue narratives in relation to Muslim women are incorporated in a political
rhetoric that is directed at multiculturalism (Bracke, 2012). As Vieten (2016) argues, a ‘pseudo-emancipatory’ gender discourse became intertwined with anti-Muslim rhetoric. Hence, shaped by a ‘civilization logic’ and ‘rescue narratives’, feminism and woman’s emancipation gradually became vital elements in a discourse that marks a difference between ‘backward tradition’ and ‘civilized modernity’. Bracke (2012) concludes that feminism and woman’s emancipation were “encapsulated within mainstream political discourses, where they became a crucial marker for civilizational politics and an easy tool to criticize or dismiss ‘multicultural society’ and Islam” (Ibid., 2012, p. 243).

In line with the civilized-backward discourse, Spierings & Zaslov (2015) found that populist radical right (PRR) parties in Northern-European countries (Nordic and the Netherlands), countries that have a liberal culture on gender equality and homosexuality (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2015), take a modern-traditional position on issues of gender equality, and also a liberal position on gay rights and emancipation (see also: Akkerman & Hagelund, 2007; Akkerman, 2015).

In addition, the strongest ‘liberal’ Islam critique, in which the Islam is criticized because it allegedly does not acknowledge or even threatens gender equality (or gay rights), is also found in the Northern-European countries, including the Netherlands (Spierings & Zaslov, 2015). Especially PVV employs this type of critique in public debate and on social media.

Since the European Migrant Crisis in 2015, besides a focus on Islam and Muslims, immigration and immigrants seems to regain emphasis of PRR parties. Forum for Democracy is a good example in this regard since they seem to focus less explicitly on Islam and Muslims, and more on immigration in general.

What about followers of PRR parties? Although little is known about the discourses that are activated and specific ways of framing gender & sexuality by radical right followers or voters, some studies address position and support for gender & sexuality issues. Gender issues are an important element in the ideology of PRR parties, but ‘not at the core of their current electoral support’ (Spierings & Zaslov, 2015, p. 171). In addition, when it comes to gay-rights in the Netherlands, a discrepancy seems to exist between the ideology of PRR parties and the attitudes of PRR voters: voters do not express pro-gay attitudes, while the ideology of PRR parties reveals support for these issues (Ibid.). These results indicate that party leadership and (online) followers might differ in the way gender & sexuality issues are discussed.
2.2.6 Open questions

I will conclude this chapter with the questions that remain after the previous discussion.

First, although some studies address the ‘liberal’ anti-Islam/immigration critique (that specifically focuses on the issues woman’s emancipation and gay rights) of PRR party leadership in Western-Europe and the Netherlands, it is unclear whether online followers discuss woman’s emancipation and gay rights in a similar fashion. Studies on the position of party leadership and voters on these issues point to fundamental differences. Therefore, the question rises whether online followers discuss woman’s emancipation and gay rights, and if they do, how these issues are framed and which discourses are activated in claims in which they are mentioned.

Second, although PVV is included in some of the studies mentioned earlier, the younger party FvD is not. Although FvD seems less explicit about gender & sexuality issues compared to PVV, they clearly mention the importance of equal treatment in their proposal ‘Law for the protection of Dutch values’ (‘All people are fundamentally equal, regardless of sex, race or sexual preference’). Also in public debate, the party claims to be for gender equality and gay rights. Nonetheless, a systematic analysis of whether and how gender & sexually issues are discussed by FvD and their online followers is missing. As a result, it remains unclear to what extent PVV and FvD and their online followers are comparable and/or different in this respect. In regard to online followers, as mentioned, this research will provide an answer.

Third, little is known about the way other issues related to gender & sexuality, such as transgenderism, more diverse gender identities and gender neutrality are discussed by party leadership, voters and online followers. In this report, I will focus on online followers of PVV and FvD and analyze whether these issues are discussed, and if so, in what manner. In addition, I will focus on differences between the framing of distinct gender & sexuality issues, and between online followers of PVV and FvD in this regard.

In the following chapter, I will further elaborate on how I will approach this research methodologically, and how I will answer the questions posed here.
3. Methodology

This research project consisted of three phases. The first phase relied on automated content analysis, which is a quantitative approach in order to describe a large amount of textual social media data. This phase focused mainly on the first research question concerning the salience of gender & sexuality issues. In addition, the second research question is partially answered by analyzing the connection between the issues gender & sexuality and nativism.

In order to provide a more profound answer to the second research question on the framing of gender and sexuality issues by PVV and FvD followers, in the second phase I employed a qualitative approach based on frame analysis and close reading. This was followed by the third phase: a systematic process of manual quantitative content analysis. The results of the second and third phase helped to establish differences and/or similarities in the framing of particular gender and sexuality issues and between online followers of both parties.

In this chapter I will discuss these research phases in depth, and elaborate on the limitations, validity and validation of this study. First, I will address sampling.

3.1 Sampling

I use what Bryman (2012) calls ‘generic purposive sampling’ with a fixed, a priori sample, which implies that criteria for the selection of cases or contexts were established beforehand, based on the research question, after which I sampled the cases or context that fit the established criteria (Ibid., 2012, p. 422). When dealing with social media data, sampling can be done by theme, meaning data are collected based on keywords, or by time, implying data are collected within a specified timeframe (Herring, 2004). I chose to the latter, since it is impossible to determine salience—which is part of the first research question—when using a theme-based data collection.

For both parts of the research, I relied on textual data from the Facebook-pages of PVV (@geertwilders) and FvD (@forumvoordemocratie). More specifically, I have collected direct comments that react on Facebook posts of PVV and FvD, between January 2017 and April 2018. (N PVV = 166,594; N FvD = 279,024). These data were scraped from the Facebook pages by using the SMA-add-on in the Orange software package. This add-on relies on Facebook’s own API, therefore, the data that I am able to subtract is specified by Facebook’s regulations.

For the second research question, I filtered the time-based dataset containing all comments posted within the specified timeframe, based on gender and sexuality keywords¹ (N PVV = 823; N FvD = 763). A theme-based data selection has a few important advantages. Because the dataset has ‘topical coherence’ (Herring, 2004) when it is selected based on a theme, and is a specific selection

¹ See the appendix for the list of keywords
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of a large amount of content, it is easier to conduct an in-depth analysis in order to see how and in what context topics regarding gender and sexuality are discussed.

3.2 First phase: automatic content analysis

The first research question was answered by measuring how frequent gender & sexuality issues are mentioned in the Facebook comments of the online followers of both parties, over a period of over one year, compared to the issues anti-elitism (which is about established politics, both left- and right-wing) and nativism (which is about immigration and Islam).

The measurement of the salience of these issues was done by employing a dictionary approach and multiple packages in R. For each issue, a number of keywords was selected based on a manual assessment of comments, in which I analyzed what words are used to describe the issues under study. Then, the dictionary was used for the analysis of both pages, which enables comparison between the results. Therefore, in the selection of keywords, I preferred general words instead of specific terminology for either PVV or FvD. Although, in the case of anti-elitism, I included the word ‘partijkartel’, which is FvD-terminology. Excluding this word would lead to an underestimation of anti-elitism in FvD comments.2

Before the dictionary search was conducted, the corpus was preprocessed, which included removing stop words and punctuation, and converting to lowercase text. Then, based on the amount of hits per document (comment) for each issue, (meaning the frequency a keyword related to one of the issues is mentioned in a comment), the attention per topic was calculated. I aggregated to the mean of hits per issue, per week.

Second, based on the theoretical framework in which I showed that populist radical right employ a ‘liberal’ Islam/immigration critique, which implies that women’s and gay issues are used to criticize Islam and immigration, we can expect that the gender & sexuality and nativism issues are strongly connected. If so, the attention for these issues over time should follow a similar pattern. In order to test this assumption, I calculated the correlation between the issues over time.

Third, when a ‘liberal’ Islam/immigration critique is present, we can expect that words related to gender & sexuality, and mainly woman’s and gay issues, are often cooccurring with words that are related to Islam or immigration. Therefore, I created and analyzed a semantic network to see if these words are indeed occurring in clusters. This was done by using the ‘corpustools’ package in R. According to Drieger (2013), ‘[q]ualitatively, clusters represent groups of strongly connected words and thus may indicate complex semantic concepts that are described by words which aren’t likely to be connected to other semantic concepts’ (Drieger, 2013). Hence, this method helped to establish

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2 The words that constitute the dictionary are included in the appendix
whether a ‘liberal’ Islam/immigration critique is present in the Facebook comments of online followers of PVV and FvD.

Since I am specifically interested in the link between gender & sexuality and anti-Islam/immigration sentiments, for the semantic network I filtered comments that specifically mention gender and sexuality issues—and specifically woman’s and gay issues, since these issues are mainly employed in a ‘liberal’ Islam/immigration critique. In order to select the appropriate keywords, I read the comments on multiple posts that mention gender & sexuality issues. I eventually chose to select comments based on four straightforward keywords: ‘homo’, ‘gay’, ‘geaardheid’ and ‘vrouwen’. Word combinations that contain one of these words are included. After this selection, I manually checked whether the selection was indeed containing messages that are relevant for the purpose of this study.

This process resulted in a selection of 1147 comments. Preprocessing the data consisted of, first of all, removing duplicate comments. I chose to leave out all comments that were 80% similar, or more. In the subsequent steps of preprocessing, I removed punctuation, numbers and stop words. From the preprocessed corpus, the semantic network was constructed based on how often certain tokens cooccur within a given word-distance—in this case 10 (Welbers & van Atteveldt, 2018). Next, the network was filtered, in order to limit the amount of ‘vertices’ (similar to nodes). This was done by leaving out the vertices that are not significant, based on an alpha level (0.1). The alpha-level was lowered, until a specific amount of vertices remains (Welbers, 2016), in this case I chose for 150 vertices.

In order to establish whether the network is robust, I tested the results of multiple preprocess settings to see if the network and the words that appear in it changed significantly. After I deleted some very long, duplicate comments manually, the results were rather stable, although at higher ‘window sizes’, the word ‘Islam’ disappeared.

### 3.3 Second and third phase: Frame analysis and manual content analysis

The second phase is based in the principles of frame analysis, which focuses on the ‘strategic and deliberative side of language usage’ (Lindekilde, 2014), in this case of online followers of PVV and FvD. Frame analysis ‘looks at how existing “objects” or “topics” are framed by different actors, bending their meaning in certain directions’ (Ibid). Hence, the focus on particular meaning-making processes makes frame analysis a social constructivist, interpretive approach, that intends to trance ‘the dialectal relation between concrete “speech acts” and their socio-material context’ (Ibid.). In line with Goffman’s (1979) initial outline of a ‘frame’, underlying this analysis is the notion that meaning is not fixed, but the product of continual ‘interactions and negotiations’ between individuals and collectives (Vliegenthart and van Zoonen, 2011).
For this phase of research, I manually browsed through the Facebook posts of both PVV and FvD, by using the Orange software package. When a post discussed something related to gender and sexuality, I browsed through the direct comments replying on the post. Then, through a process of close-reading, I analyzed the comments by means of grammatical structure, which implies identifying the issue (what gender and sexuality topic is mentioned?), the subject (who or what does something in the sentence?), and the object (who or what experiences the effect of the action undertaken by the subject?). Based on this analysis I extracted and coded the frames that are used in regard to either the issue, subject or object. The identified frames that are the result of this process, form the basis of the codebook that is included in the appendix.

For the third phase, the manual quantitative content analysis, I applied the same approach in a systematic way, coding a larger amount of comments deductively. Since I am specifically interested in comments that discuss gender and sexuality issues, I filtered the total amount of comments based on gender and sexuality keywords (the specific keywords are included in the appendix). Eventually, after removing duplicate comments, 763 comments of online FvD followers were coded, and 823 of online PVV followers.

In table 1 an example is provided as to how the manual quantitative coding was conducted: first I analyzed the grammatical structure of the comments and identified the issue, subject and object; second, I coded the framing of one or multiple of these elements, based on the codebook. However, when I discovered a new frame during the deductive coding, I added that to the codebook.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Message</th>
<th>Claimant</th>
<th>Issue</th>
<th>Frame Issue</th>
<th>Subject</th>
<th>Frame Subject</th>
<th>Object</th>
<th>Frame Object</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>x</td>
<td>Online follower of PVV</td>
<td>Womens emancipation</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>Muslim men</td>
<td>Are treating woman badly, i.e. without respect, possibly violent</td>
<td>Muslim women</td>
<td>Women are not free, inferior to men, oppressed</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 3.4 Limitations, validity and validation

The methods of automated text analysis that are being used in the first research phase, make it possible to investigate large corpora of textual social media data, within a limited amount of time—especially compared to time-consuming, qualitative methods of content analysis. However, this method is not without limitations. I used a dictionary approach, which implies that the measurement of issue-attention depends on the selected keywords—therefore, a consistent and valid measurement is dependent on the right words. Manually checking the result that a particular set of keywords yields is essential. Furthermore, the preprocessing of the data will influence the...
results. Therefore, the effect of different settings on the results must be tested to check the robustness. In addition, the calculation of a correlation between issues over time requires caution. Although the relation between the issues under study here—nativism and gender and sexuality—is theoretically feasible, I have been carefully in my conclusions based on these calculations. Especially since the level of aggregation influenced the results: the correlation between the attention for these issues per day was much lower.

Also the other method that is used in the first phase, semantic network analysis, has its limitations. Duplicate comments and the great difference between the length of comments in the dataset influences the results quite heavily. Therefore, cleaning the data manually and through automated preprocessing is important. In addition, since the results are filtered based on the most significant vertices, particular uninformative word combinations that cooccur frequently (e.g. first and last names), influence the network. Therefore, cleaning and preprocessing the data took a lot of time. In order to minimize the chance that the results are influenced by unforeseen errors in the data, I checked the results at multiple preprocess settings, and discussed the connections and clusters that were most stable.

For the qualitative frame analysis and the manual content analysis (in the second and third research phase), the lacking of multiple coders to ensure that codes or frames are independent of a researchers personal interpretation, can be seen as a limitation. One way to nonetheless ensure empirical rigor, is by defining each coding category in explicit terms and to apply the codes consistently to the data (Herring, 2004). An explicit formulation of frames emerged in the qualitative second research phase, by moving back and forth between the data and the defined frames—constantly testing tentative formulations on new comments. Through this iterative process, the defined frames are checked by the data, and refined if needed. In addition, by letting another researcher apply the defined frames to a limited amount of data, I checked which formulations were clear, and which were ambiguous. This resulted in a codebook, in which frames regarding gender and sexuality are defined in a specific and clear way, so they can be applied in the deductive coding process. In this systematic, third research phase, it was important to apply the codes consistently to the data.

More generally: the research design, as outlined here, implies that method-triangulation is an important aspect that improves the validity of findings. By employing multiple methods of content analysis, both quantitative and qualitative, findings of one method can be corroborated by another. For example, connections in the semantic network can corroborate certain qualitative interpretations, and vice versa. Also, the salience of issues that is measured in the first phase, can help to explain frequencies of certain frames in the third phase.
4. Salience of gender & sexuality issues

In the following sections, I will first present and discuss the results that reveal the attention per issue over time, in order to establish how salient issues of gender & sexuality are in the Facebook comments of PVV and FvD followers, compared to issues that are most associated with these radical right parties: anti-elitism (which is about established politics, both left- and right-wing) and nativism (which is about immigration and Islam). This section is followed by the results on the connection between the issues gender & sexuality and nativism over time. Finally, I will discuss the extent to which the connection between these issues points to a ‘liberal’ Islam/immigration critique.

4.1 Attention over time

Figure 1 shows the attention per issue per week, over the period of (a bit over) one year, in the comments on the PVV Facebook page. It becomes clear that of the three issues, gender & sexuality is discussed the least: this issue gets much less attention than the other issues, while the attention for anti-elitism and nativism is quite equal throughout this timeframe. Nonetheless there is one outlier. In week 33, the attention for nativism far exceeded anti-elitism and gender & sexuality. In this week, PVV posted a video about Muhammad, in which he is called a terrorist, among other things, leading to the statement that the West should de-Islamize. This video was posted in Dutch and English, was liked and shared between 2000 and 3000 times, and got hundreds of comments. As such, these were one of the most popular posts in the dataset, explaining the high attention for nativism in the comments of this week.

When looking at gender & sexuality, three peaks are remarkable where the attention for this issue is above average. Also in this case, the peaks can be explained by looking at the posts of PVV in that week. In two of the three peak-weeks, PVV posted something related to gender & sexuality. In one case, PVV shared a picture of two hands, with the line ‘This is the Islam according to the Koran and Muhammad: homosexuality is punishable by death’. In the other case, the party shared an e-mail written by a native Dutch girl, who shared an unpleasant experience, that is to say, she described how she was assaulted by two Moroccan guys who had spit in her face, which made her realize Geert Wilders was right all along. The other peak was in a week that PVV posted quite successfully on Islamic elementary schools—a post that did not contain a direct link to gender & sexuality, but somehow triggered responses in the comments that contained the issue frequently.

To conclude, an inspection of the three peaks suggests that online followers of PVV are framing gender and sexuality in terms of civilized-backward distinction, rather than conservative-progressive.
Now let’s look at the other party, Forum for Democracy. In figure 2, the results are presented. Here also, of the three issues, the gender & sexuality issue gets least attention over time. In addition, the nativism issue gets less attention compared to PVV. This is not surprising, since the main issue of PVV is Islam, and FvD talks more about (restrictive) immigration in a general sense. In the comments on the FvD-page, anti-elitism is most discussed, which also corresponds to the focus of the party on the political elite, which they call ‘partijkartel’. A few remarkable peaks need some explanation. First, the peak attention for the issue anti-elitism in week 17 is explained by the controversy about shady business deals by VVD politicians, that FvD mentioned in multiple posts, which yielded a lot of likes and comments. The peak of attention in week 32 for nativism can be explained by the terrorist attack in Barcelona, that according to FvD was not discussed by the established political parties. Instead, the party stated in a Facebook post, they were occupied with the egg-crisis. In addition, in the same week FvD posted about Jihadists in the Netherlands, and demanded that their passport should be confiscated immediately. Also this post got a lot of comments (900+) and likes (5000+).
When comparing between both parties, in the comments on the PVV-page there is more attention for gender & sexuality—a difference that is constant over time.

Based on these results, it is clear that of the three issues, gender & sexuality is yielding least attention. In line with the spearheads of the parties, in the comments of PVV, nativism gets the most attention, although the difference with anti-elitism is not substantial; in the comments on the FvD-page, there is a clear focus on anti-elitism.

4.2 The connection between gender & sexuality and nativism

The following section will focus on the second question, about whether the issues gender & sexuality and nativism are connected. Let’s see if the entanglement of these issues is present in the attention patterns over time.

The attention per issue over time—as presented in figure 1 and 2—suggests that, although the level of attention differs, the attention for the two issues seems to follow a similar pattern over the 54 weeks in the dataset.
When focussing on the peaks (and the qualitative inspection of the corresponding comments and posts), it seems that, when there is a peak of attention for nativism, the attention for gender & sexuality goes up as well—most clearly observable when focussing on the three highest attention-peaks for the gender & sexuality issue. The extent to which there is a pattern between both issues becomes more clear when we calculate the correlation. In table 1 and 2, the correlation between the amount of attention for the issues per week in the comments on both party pages is presented. It shows that only between the issues nativism and gender & sexuality, a strong and significant positive correlation exists, suggesting a positive relationship between the amount of attention per week for these two issues. When the attention for one issue in a particular week increases or decreases, so does the attention for the other issue (in most weeks). However, when checking correlations between the issues per day, the correlation becomes weaker, but is still significant (R=0.24, P<0.001, N=449). Thus, a statistical relationship between these issues depends on the aggregate level.

Nonetheless, looking at the attention per week might be appropriate in this case, since the topics are often related to news items, to which the parties respond, to which online followers respond. Therefore, attention for these particular issues often extends beyond a day, as can be seen by the fact that comments on a particular post are often posted over the period of multiple days.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Immigration</th>
<th>Politics</th>
<th>G&amp;S</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nativism</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>-0.28</td>
<td>0.65*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-elitism</td>
<td>-0.28</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>-0.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender &amp; sexuality</td>
<td>0.65*</td>
<td>-0.10</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes. N = 54, * P<0.001

### 4.3 Semantic connections: a ‘liberal’ Islam/immigration critique?

In order to see if the content of the comments also reveals a connection between the issues gender and sexuality and nativism, I will now look at the semantic connections in the comments on both party-pages. More specifically: the networks in figure 4 and 5 represents the cooccurrence of words within a given word-distance, or ‘window’. I will start by analyzing the PVV network.
In general, the network shows a few constant clusters (that remain in the network at different preprocess settings), of which the most prominent one is what could be labelled the nationalistic cluster. Colored in red, words that constitute this cluster are ‘we’, ‘land’, ‘Dutch’, ‘culture’, ‘identity’, ‘norms and values’, ‘freedom of expression’ and ‘citizens’. There are multiple edges connecting the nationalistic cluster to the (orange-colored) gender cluster, constituted by words such as ‘women’, ‘mothers’, ‘daughters’ and ‘men’, but also ‘equal rights’. In addition, another orange-colored cluster that contains words related to gender & sexuality, such as ‘sexual preference’, ‘sex’ and ‘straight’, is connected to ‘culture’ and ‘freedom of expression’ in the nationalistic cluster. Thus, many and strong connections exist between the nationalistic cluster and the gender cluster. As such, on a more abstract level, these semantic connections seem to indicate an overlap or entanglement between notions of gender and nation.
Furthermore, some isolated connections in the network point to Islam-related arguments. The word ‘Islamite’ (meaning ‘Muslim’) is connected to ‘assault’, which is connected to ‘women’. Also, words that describe ‘headscarf’ are connected to ‘women’ (in the plural form) and ‘have to’, while ‘woman’ is connected to ‘driving car’—most likely referring to the fact that women in Saudi Arabia are not allowed to drive. The word ‘gay’ is connected to ‘Jews’, which is strongly connected to ‘Christians’, which is connected to ‘Islamite’. All these connections point to often-heard arguments in which women, woman’s rights, gays and gay rights, are employed to oppose Islam or Muslims: women are assaulted (by Muslim men or immigrants); obligated or forced to wear a headscarf; not allowed to drive in certain Islamic countries; and gays are, just like Jews and Christians, often portrayed as victims of Islam. These connections are corroborated by the qualitative findings, as presented in the following section. Hence, connections between (specific) issues of gender and sexuality and Islam are present in the semantic network of PVV followers.

I will now move on to the other party, FvD and analyze the semantic network of comments from their Facebook page, as presented in figure 5. Clusters in this network that stand out are, first of all, the politics cluster, colored in red. This cluster contains the names of the most prominent political parties in the Netherlands, both the left-wing and right-wing parties, the name of D66 party-leader Alexander Pechtold, and the words ‘accused of racism’, ‘homophobic’, ‘Islamophobic’, ‘party’, ‘party leader’, ‘town councilor’ and ‘Amsterdam’. These words refer to two central topics: the fact that FvD is accused of Islamophobia, homophobia and racism by established political parties, and on the other hand, the accusation of homophobia towards an Islamic town councilor of D66. In line with the latter, the word ‘D66’ is connected to ‘homosexuality’, which is connected to ‘sin’ which is connected to ‘mosque’—all in the light-green cluster. These connections seem to point to the entanglement to the topics gay sexuality, Islam and (a critique on) established politics, or what FvD call the ‘partijkartel’. Also these connections are corroborated by the results of the qualitative study, presented later on.

Self-evidently, since I selected the comments based on gender & sexuality keywords, the gender cluster is present, colored in green. This cluster contains the words ‘women’, ‘children’, ‘young girls’, ‘completely equal’, ‘equal’, ‘irrespective of’ which is connected to ‘sex’, ‘religion’, ‘sexual preference’. The latter word cluster refers to FvD’s proposed law for the protection of Dutch values, in which they state that everyone is equal in the Netherlands, regardless of these characteristics. Also connected to this cluster is the phrase ‘completely equal’, which is then connected to ‘women’ and ‘men’. These connections point to statements on gender equality. In addition, there are connections between ‘women’ and ‘FvD’ and ‘Baudet’—the party leader of Forum for Democracy. These connections might point to critique on Thierry Baudet for his women-unfriendly remarks in the past, since ‘Baudet’ is also connected to ‘dissociate from’.
Next, I want to highlight the green cluster in the top of the network, in which the word ‘gay’ is linked to ‘higher’ which is linked to ‘IQ’ which is linked to ‘Ramautarsing’. This cluster refers to the controversy around a FvD member that was running for candidacy in the local council in Amsterdam, Yernaz Ramautarsing. He made remarks in which he connected homosexuality to IQ, stating that gays have a higher IQ on average, and since gays are not having children, this is bad for society.

Overall, it is clear that the comments on the FvD page focus mainly on established politics. Consequently, the issues homosexuality and Islam seem to be embedded in remarks about other political parties, mainly the liberal D66. This connection is consolidated by the controversy around the Islamic D66 councilor and her remarks on homosexuality, which is mentioned very often by FvD followers. On the other hand, gender and gender equality seem more autonomous topics, that are mainly linked to the party and its leader, Thierry Baudet. This may include critique on Baudet,
Means to an End: The framing of gender & sexuality

but also statements in which men and women are referred to as ‘completely equal’ and gender equality is referred to as a Dutch value—however, the link with ‘Dutchness’ or Islam is not evident here. Although ‘wearing headscarf’ is linked to women, and ‘Muslim’ is linked to ‘dirty’, these connections are more isolated in the network.

4.4 Chapter conclusion

It became clear that of the three issues under study, gender & sexuality gets the least attention in the comments of PVV and FvD followers over time: both focus more on anti-elitism and nativism. This is constant over the total amount of weeks. In comments of PVV followers, nativism gets the most attention, while FvD followers discussed anti-elitism more. These results provide a clear answer to the first research question, namely, the salience of gender and sexuality issues is relatively low.

Furthermore, based on the attention over time, it seems that the issues nativism and gender & sexuality are connected. The attention for both issues follows a similar pattern over time, which is corroborated by the correlation between the amount of attention for these issues per week. When attention for nativism increases in a certain week, so does the attention for gender & sexuality in many cases. Thus, these results might indicate PVV and FvD followers employ a ‘liberal’ Islam/immigration critique, since the issues are connected. However, the specific nature of this connection remains unclear, which is elucidated by the analysis of the semantic network, based on comments that mention woman’s and gay issues.

Also in the semantic network, the focus of FvD followers is on established politics, which is clearly distinguishable by the politics cluster. This cluster is connected to issues of homosexuality and gay rights, that are entangled with Islam issues. In the case of FvD comments, the gender cluster seems less strongly connected to Islam or immigration issues. Although gender equality is discussed and referred to as ‘complete’, a link to Dutch values and Islam is not explicitly present in the network.

In the case of PVV, there are clear connection between the nationalistic cluster and the gender cluster, indicating that gender and gender equality are discussed in relation to the nation and national norms and values. In addition, other connections point directly to statements about gender and Islam.

Thus, although the networks reveal some implicit signs of a ‘liberal’ Islam/immigration critique, its remains difficult to determine the structure and nature of the claims related to gender & sexuality in the comments. An in-depth and systematic manual analysis of the same content can provide a more decisive answer. This was the focus of the second and third research phase, of which the results are presented in the following chapter.
5. Gender & sexuality frames

This chapter is divided into two main sections, that to a large extent represent the two discourses as outlined in the theoretical chapter. The one opposing certain issues of gender & sexuality in line with the conservative-progressive discourse, the other claiming support for woman's emancipation and gay rights in order to criticize Islam and/or immigrants—in line with the civilized-backward discourse—and left-wing politics. Let’s start with the latter.

5.1 Means to an End: women’s and gay issues

Although it was difficult to observe a 'liberal' anti-Islam/immigration critique (in line with the civilized-backward discourse) in the semantic networks in the previous chapter, the qualitative analysis made it crystal clear: PVV and FvD followers employ women's issues and gay issues to criticize Islam and immigrants, and criticize established politics. Women's issues (including women's emancipation and rights and gender equality) and gay issues (including the acceptance of homosexuality and gay rights) are so firmly embedded in anti-Islam, anti-immigration and/or anti-elitism rhetoric, that they are exclusively mentioned in this context—never independently. As a pivotal element in nativist rhetoric, woman's emancipation and gay rights serve as a way to underpin particular assumptions about these 'external' and 'internal enemies'—for example, the irreconcilability of Islam and Dutch culture.

In this rhetoric, framing of Muslims, immigrants and Islam functions in multiple, interconnected ways: on the one hand, it specifically problematizes Muslim- and immigrant men as a threat for female and gay bodies, and Islam more generally as endangering woman's emancipation and gay rights, and on the other hand, it victimizes women and gays. These frames are moreover used to discredit and delegitimize specific politicians, parties or established politics in the general.

5.1.1 Problematizing Muslims, immigrants and Islam

In figure 6, three prominent frames (in terms of frequency) that incorporate women's and gay issues to criticize Muslims, immigrants or Islam are presented. PVV followers clearly employ these particular frames more than those of FvD. However, in both cases, claims in which Islam, Muslims or immigrants are framed as bad for/towards women clearly outnumber the claims in which a comparable frame is employed with regard to gays. Claims in which Islam/Muslims are explicitly framed as backwards regarding women's and gay issues are least prominent—however, PVV followers still use this frame frequently. Let's discuss the content of the claims more in-depth.
Muslim- and immigrant men are often framed as treating women badly, which includes treating women without respect, as inferior and/or violently. The emphasis on Muslim- and immigrant men who disrespect women and treat them as inferior builds on the assumption that these men do not accept gender equality and woman's emancipation, unlike Dutch or Western men, while the emphasis on violence clearly frames them as dangerous—a direct threat. ‘Women’ in these particular frames often refers to either Muslim women or native ‘Dutch’ or ‘Western’ women, however, in most cases, claims address threats towards the latter. Sometimes claims only contain one of these three frames, or a combination between multiple frames, as the following examples show:

‘[…] the refugees who come here, are men for the most part (90%). Who come here to rape our girls. Because it is so dangerous where they come from, they left their women and children behind’ (#842, PVV).

‘In Norway (as in many other European countries) almost all rapists have an Islamic background. This is because many Muslims think scantily/sexy dressed women or girls ask for it, because they dress this way. That may be true in the Islamic world, but not in the free west!!’ (#349, PVV).
In these claims, Muslim or immigrant men are framed as sexually violent towards ‘our’ women and not accepting or conforming to ‘Dutch’ or ‘Western’ notions of emancipation or equality. Although the meaning of ‘our’ women is not explicited, it seems to point to native ‘Dutch’ or ‘European’ women, which consequently creates a chasm between ‘Dutch’ or ‘European’ (meaning native) and ‘non-Dutch’ or ‘non-European’ (meaning non-native). Similarly, other claims differentiate between ‘the free West’ and ‘the Islamic world’, or between Christianity and Islam in terms of their supposed position on issues of gender equality and woman’s emancipation. Thus, these fragments are characteristic of the discriminatory utilization of ‘women’ and ‘women’s emancipation’ in many claims of PVV and FvD followers, but PVV in particular.

It is interesting that ‘Muslims’ and ‘immigrants’ often means ‘Muslim men’ or ‘immigrant men’. See for example claim #349: ‘Muslims think…sexy dresses women’. So, although not always explicitly mentioned or addressed as such, the context reveals that these claims are indeed about Muslim or immigrant men.

In a similar fashion, my findings show that Muslim-, immigrant-, or Moroccan men are framed as treating gays badly, which includes not accepting homosexuality, treating gays without respect and/or violent. Here also, the claims often contain, on the one hand, the emphasis on Muslims or immigrants as not accepting ‘Dutch’ values on homosexuality, and on the other hand, the emphasis on violence by framing them as a direct threat towards (naive Dutch) gays—frames that can be used separately or to reinforce each other.

Islam is framed as being backwards with regard to woman’s emancipation (including gender equality and woman’s rights) and gay rights, and endangering the preservation of these liberal values. When analyzing the context in which they are used, it becomes evident that frames on women’s and gay issues are strategically employed to underpin particular assumptions about Islam: the incompatibility of Islamic and Dutch culture and the inferiority of Islamic culture in terms of progressiveness—expressed by comparing the ‘backwardness’ of Islam with ‘liberal’ Dutch culture. My analysis reveals that ‘backwardness’-frames are employed in three different ways, of which I will present examples below.

(1) ‘Islam is against gays? YES. Islam is oppression? YES. Islam is against all rights for women, that man have? YES. Islam is a danger for our politics? YES’ (#987, PVV). | ‘Islamic norms and values? Mary off young girls, throwing gays head down of a building, threaten people with death for making a drawing… Which Islamic values are they talking about exactly?’ (#628, PVV).
These examples are exemplary of a rhetorical style in which presumed facts about Islam are presented in an enumerative manner. Rather than comparing Islam with Dutch culture, or explicitly arguing why Islam does not fit in the Netherlands, these claims present a collection of negative frames about Islam without a clear conclusion or interpretation. It creates a specific reality about Islam by selecting and combining popular assumptions, beliefs and folk wisdoms—among which are beliefs on the position and consequence of Islam on woman and gay issues.

(2) ‘Islamic culture and the Western culture differ on multiple, fundamental aspects: women's rights, freedom and religion, freedom of expression, equality of man/women, heterosexual/homosexual. Do you think these cultural differences will not lead to conflict?’ (#700, PVV).

These claims shows how Islam is framed as incompatible with Dutch culture, however, without the explicit hierarchy of ‘backward’ and ‘liberal’ (or ‘civilized’). Rather, these claims mark a difference between Dutch and Islamic culture—again underpinned by the assumed difference in respect to woman and gay issues, among other things—that will inevitably result in conflict and turmoil, so these PVV and FvD followers argue.

(3) ‘[…] The influence of Islam is not good for our country. It is a very old-fashioned religion, with a moral that we left far behind. And we would like to keep it that way. Is the fact that gays can’t walk hand in hand anymore in Amsterdam not due to the influence of Islam?’ (#292, FvD).

The third example illustrates how Islam is framed as ‘backward’, ‘barbaric’ or ‘old-fashioned’, supposedly in sharp contrast with the ‘free’ and ‘liberal’ character of Dutch culture—women and gay issues are employed as a dividing line between these two frames. While women's emancipation, gender equality, the acceptance of homosexuality and gay rights are appropriated as ‘Dutch’, violence and oppression towards women and the repudiation of homosexuality is attributed to Islam—qualities that are alien to Dutch culture, so it appears when reading these claims.

Interestingly, according to some PVV followers, the divide between Islamic and Dutch culture is due to Islam (and Muslims), which is expressed in statements like ‘causing a parallel society’ or ‘alienating itself’. Apparently, the alienating character of their own claims—containing expressions like ‘Islam does not belong in a free […] society’ and ‘It does not fit in our culture’—is not perceived as such.

To conclude: in the claims on Islam (but also on Muslims and immigrants), the acceptance of homosexuality and gay rights are explicitly or implicitly associated with ‘Dutch’ or ‘Dutch values’, and opposed to ‘Islam’ and ‘Islamic values’. Similar to the way gender issues are discussed, gay issues are also subject to a discriminatory utilization: marking a difference between ‘Dutch’ (meaning native) and ‘Non-Dutch’ (meaning non-native and Islamic).
In the following section, I will elaborate on the other side of the same medal: the framing of common ‘victims’ of Muslim men, immigrant men and Islam—women and gays.

5.1.2 Victimizing women and gays

Figure 7 presents the most important frames on native Dutch women, Muslim women and gays. The difference in terms of frequency is striking: PVV followers use these frames more often than those of FvD. This is in line with the fact that, in general, Muslim women and gays are mentioned more often in the comments of PVV followers. However, native Dutch women are mentioned slightly more in the comments of FvD followers (see the descriptive statistics in the appendix). Nonetheless, the framing of native Dutch women presented in figure 7 is predominantly used by PVV followers, since native Dutch women are in danger due to Muslim or immigrant men—which is something PVV followers are more concerned with. In addition, figure 7 shows that the three groups are framed in fundamentally different ways, although there is some overlap between the framing of native Dutch women and gays. Also, in the comments of online PVV followers, the headscarf is explicitly framed as a sign of inferiority.
Muslim women are framed as ‘oppressed’, which includes they are lacking freedom and being treated as inferior to men. In addition, they are framed as ‘assaulted’, which means treated violently by Muslim men. On the one hand, framing Muslim women as ‘oppressed’ often involves assumed differences between Islamic and Dutch culture in terms of gender issues and depicts Muslim women as victims of Muslim men and/or the Islamic culture and religion. On the other hand, framing Muslim woman as ‘assaulted’ depicts them as victims of Muslim men, who are the violent aggressors in this scenario. These particular frames are connected to the framing of the headscarf as a sign of inferiority, as mentioned, and the assumption that Muslim women want to be freed from the ‘oppression’ of the Islamic culture and religion. Let’s take a closer look at a few examples:

‘Like I said before, the headscarf and other clothing attributes don’t represent the person but the system of Islam, which is enslaving women, because the woman is property of the [man], like a bike or an umbrella’(#120, PVV).

‘That headscarf has nothing to do with Allah!!! These women are not allowed to show themselves to other men! They are submissive to their own man, […] their man is keeping them under the thumb, they must do the housekeeping and be silent!!!!!’(#451, FvD).

Interestingly, some claims emphasize that women’s oppression is caused by Islam, while other claims explicitly emphasize that oppression of women has nothing to do with Islam, and everything with Muslim men. Other claims combine both and frame Muslim women as oppressed by Islamic laws as well as Muslim men.

As can be seen in the first claims, the oppression of Muslim women is often associated with slavery, which involves Muslim women being framed as ‘enslaved’ by Islamic rules, Muslim men or both. This is a clear example of frame amplification, since exiting narratives or folk wisdoms—such as the rescue narratives mentioned by Bracke (2012)—are used to amplify the frame of Muslim women as oppressed.

Overall, the role of the headscarf as a symbol of oppression, backwardness and inferiority is remarkable. Although not often framed explicitly as such, implicit in many claims of PVV and FvD followers is the association between the headscarf and oppression of women and/or backwardness—as manifested by associative links between ‘headscarf’ and ‘enslavement’, ‘kept under the thumb’, ‘jealousy of Muslim men’, ‘submissive’ and ‘middle-ages’. This type of framing excludes the possibility that Muslim women wear a headscarf out of free will, as autonomous individuals—an idea that is sometimes explicitly doubted or rejected. On the contrary, it reduces Muslim women to victims; a quality that serves the anti-Islam position since it enables the framing of Islam and Muslim men as ‘threat’. Hence, although not framed as the threat themselves, as ‘victims’, Muslim women become the embodiment of everything the radical right should oppose.
In addition, as one of the most personal and visible aspects of Islamic culture, as it is worn on the body and in public, the headscarf is a physical sign which meaning has real-world consequences. It is functioning as a signifier of ‘oppression’, ‘backwardness’ and ‘otherness’ in claims of PVV and FvD followers, but also exists as an object of personal attire that is constantly loaded with this meaning. As such, the headscarf becomes an invasive sign for those who wear it: obstructing the possibility to be (perceived as) autonomous individuals, and to be anonymous.

Native Dutch women and gays are framed in different ways. As shown in figure 7, native Dutch women are framed as in danger, which involves being in danger in public space and not being able to go outside safely, because they run the risk of being assaulted or raped by Muslim-, Moroccan-, or immigrant men. In a similar fashion, also gays are framed as victims of these ‘aggressors’, however, more often comments are framing gays and homosexuality as not accepted by Muslims, based on Islamic laws. Obviously, these frames are strongly connected to the framing of Muslim- and immigrant men as discussed above. See for example the following claims:

‘Wilders is right. Look at what happens with our girls and women on the streets: they are assaulted on a daily basis by those [Moroccan] youths’ (#1093, PVV)

‘The Netherlands is becoming a second Sweden, where rapes by immigrants are the order of the day, where one violent crime is following the other, and women are advised against going out at night’ (#402, FvD).

Although not always explicitly framed as such, ‘woman’ or ‘girls’ in these claims seem to point to native Dutch women or girls, which becomes clear by phrases like ‘our women’ or ‘Dutch women’, who are in danger due to ‘those men’—being immigrant-, Muslim- or Moroccan men. Thus, these ‘women and girls’ are framed as threatened in public space, on the streets, by ‘aggressors’ that have in common a non-nativeness, or a denied nativeness—which is the case with Moroccan youths, who are most likely born in the Netherlands, or even have parents that are born in the Netherlands, but who are not framed as (native) Dutch.

5.1.3 ‘Liberal’ Islam/immigration critique and established politics

The particular framing of Islam, Muslims and immigrants on the one hand, and women and gays on the other, as discussed in the previous sections, can be called a ‘liberal’ Islam/immigration critique (Spierings & Zaslov, 2015), in which Islam, Muslims or immigrants are criticizes based on women and gay issues. This ‘liberal’ Islam/immigration critique is used to attack established politics. In figure 8, the most important frames in this regard are presented.
Established politics, and especially left-wing politics, is framed as accepting Islam or Muslims, instead of defending women and gay issues; as responsible for letting immigrants enter the Netherlands, who constitute a dangerous to women; and as naive or passive towards the position of women and gays in Islam and/or Islamic countries. Overall, the difference in terms of frequency is clear: PVV followers use these particular frames more than those of FvD. This is somewhat surprising, since the previous chapter revealed that the issue ‘anti-elitism’ (which involves established politics) is more salient in the comments of FvD followers. Especially the frames in which Islam and Muslims are mentioned, are more often used by PVV followers. Let’s look at a few examples in which these three frames are used.

‘GreenLeft has traded the rights of women, children, gays, animals and unbelievers for Islam. Also, there is no religion so damaging for the environment, so it’s hard to explain why they don’t see that at GreenLeft’ (#272, PVV).

[Responding to a Dutch minister wearing a headscarf while visiting Iran] ‘Well, now it is immediately clear how this lady thinks about the oppression of women in the far east. This is straight out treasonous. Stand for our norms and values, the hosts can also adapt [to us] ’ (#126, PVV).
In these claims, established politics, and mainly left-wing politics, is criticized for allegedly prioritizing Islam over women’s and gay issues. These claims are built on the assumption that Islam and Muslims threaten women and gay issues such as gender equality and gay rights, and on the appropriation of these issues as inherently Dutch. This assumption and appropriation makes the position of left-wing politics towards Islam and Muslims, such as wearing a headscarf and welcoming Islamic immigrants, a betrayal of Dutchness—which becomes most clear by expressions like ‘treasonous’ and ‘stand for our norms and values’. Therefore, the idea of ‘betraying Dutchness’ underlies the framing that is presented here.

In a similar fashion, established politics is framed as responsible for letting dangerous immigrants enter the Netherlands. These claims built on the assumption that immigrants are a violent threat to women, and portray them as sexual predators which then serves as an acute critique on the immigration policy of established political parties. Some claims refer to Sweden, with its alleged no-go zones and high numbers of rape delinquencies, as exemplary of how immigrants pose a threat to women and society as a whole. Thus, based on these assumptions (and alleged examples), the idea that politicians endanger women and betray the Netherlands by allowing immigrants to enter is vindicated.

5.1.4 Decline of Dutch society or the West

The framing that I will outline in this section, on what is causing the problems in Dutch society or the West in general, characterizes the main difference between PVV and FvD followers. As will become clear, gender and sexuality issues are entangled with the framing of Dutch society (or the West in general) as ‘in decline’, despite the perceived source of decline. In figure 9, the two frames that appoint the main source of decline in Dutch society (or the West in general) are presented. The difference between followers of both parties is abundantly clear: those of PVV point more often to ‘Islamization’, while those of FvD point more often to ‘the Left’.

On the one hand, Dutch society (or the West in general) is framed as in decline due to ‘Islamization’—a frame that involves the observation or prediction that Islamic norms and values, including those on homosexuality and wearing a headscarf, are ‘taking over’. On the other hand, Dutch society (or the West in general) is framed as in decline due to ‘the Left’, which includes left-wing politics, left-wing activists, ‘social justice warriors’ and feminism/feminists. This framing contains both a ‘liberal’ Islam/immigration critique to attack left-wing politics, in line with the civilized-backward discourse, as well as negative statements towards progressive gender and sexuality issues, in line with the conservative-progressive discourse. Thus, this frame implies a decline of Dutch society because left-wing politics allows Islam to ‘replace’ modern Dutch values, or a decline because society is becoming too progressive.
Let’s look at a few examples to better understand this distinction:

‘As of today, The Netherlands is ruined!!! As of today I declare the Netherlands completely insane. […] What is happening? First the negerzoen was banned, then Black Pete was erased. People who use those words are called racist. […] For a few months now, NS [Dutch railway company] stopped with ‘ladies and gentlemen’ and HEMA [Dutch clothing company] does not have a girls- or boys collection anymore. All these things are adjusted because a very small minority is disturbed by this. Everything has to be ‘gender neutral’ while everybody […] is just a male or female. Our country has totally lost it’ (#517, FvD).

‘THE GREAT DANGER FOR THE WESTERN SOCIETY IS NOT JUST ISLAM. Islam is indeed a depraved, backward and violent ideology. The only thing Muslims excel at is hatred towards foreigners, women, Jews, Christians, and themselves. […] THE GREAT DANGER FOR WESTERN SOCIETY IS THE WESTERNER. Or actually a specific part of the Westerners. With which I mean the slimy group that unites in left-wing parties, the mainstream media and similar institutions. These slimy, weak and unreliable fellow Dutchmen are collaborators of Islam. […] They strike at the roots of democracy and the constitutional state’ (#665, PVV).
The first statement illustrates how claims point to the progressive left-wing agenda—such as gender neutral policy—and progressive movements such as feminism and environmental activists as responsible for the observed or predicted ‘decline’ of Dutch society. Especially FvD followers express negative opinions towards ‘progressiveness’ in general—a point to which I will return further on. The other claim points to left-wing politics and media as endangering Dutch society, because they ‘collaborate’ with Islam which ‘excels at hatred towards women’. Here, the ‘liberal’ Islam critique is employed to attack left-wing politics and media, and to blame them for the observed or predicted decline of society and democracy.

In line with the conclusion of the theoretical framework and the results in the previous chapter, that revealed PVV focuses heavily on Islam, PVV followers overwhelmingly point to Islamization as causing a decline of Dutch society, rather than left-wing politics. See the following examples:

‘In a short while they have taken over the Netherlands. There will be a total Islamization. Women will no longer be able to go outside without a headscarf, men will be circumcised. Everybody will have to be Muslim. […]’ (#661, PVV).

These claims built on assumptions about violent Muslim masculinity, as outlined in the previous sections, and on a (very common) overestimation of the number of Muslims in the Netherlands. In addition, they represent Dutch society as in a downward spiral, heading towards a bleak future if nothing is done to stop the Islamization trend—a famous rhetorical technique that Geert Wilders uses as well. As the examples above show, woman’s emancipation as an appropriated Dutch value is embedded in this rhetoric since the freedom (and safety) of native Dutch women is supposedly on the line, which adds a concrete sense of urgency to the claims.

5.1.5 Hypocrisy of established politics

In addition to the ‘liberal’ Islam critique that is used to attack established politics, women and gays issues also enable PVV and FvD followers to frame established politics as ‘hypocritical’. An argument that goes something like this: ‘they claim to defend these issues, but are not women- or gay-friendly themselves’. FvD followers employ this particular frame more often (count: FvD = 66; PVV = 11), which is in line with the conclusions in the pervious chapter, that their focus is on established politics, while PVV followers focus heavily on Islam. Thus, while PVV followers more often use the ‘liberal’ Islam critique to attack established politics, the main critique of FvD followers on established politics is based on their supposed hypocrisy, and does not directly involve Islam.
Although this frame addresses established politics in a broad sense, most critique was targeted at D66 (the liberal democrats), and its leader Alexander Pechtold. A point of critique that is often recycled, involves a local councilor for D66 in Amsterdam with an Islamic background, who in the past made remarks about how homosexuality is considered a sin in Islam. The emphasis in these claims is not on the fact that the local councilor is Islamic, but on the fact that she represents D66. Her remarks are solely used to discredit the party by framing it as not truly gay-friendly, anti-gay or homophobic, which is expressed by phrases like ‘Demonizing 66…is now even recruiting homophobes because they are so progressive’ (#255, FvD). As corroborated by connections in the semantic network between ‘D66’, ‘local councilor’ and ‘homophobic’, this particular incident has become a popular device for FvD followers to criticize a party that is perceived as a symbol of ‘hypocritical’ left-wing politics.

5.1.6 Counter frames: critique on the radical right

As I already emphasized in the introduction, not only do comments of FvD and PVV followers support ideas of party leadership, also opposing claims are made in which the parties, their ideas or leaders are criticized. I will conclude this last section by looking at these counter-frames. They are presented in figure 11.

The counter frames that are presented in figure 11 consist of two types. The first reveals the ‘hypocrisy’ of the party for ‘using’ women and gay issues. This type contains the framing of the party as hypocritical, since it: (a) is using the issues solely as a rhetorical tool against Islam; (b) ignores the fact that other groups also reject issues such as homosexuality and gender equality, e.g. Christians, ‘normal’ Dutch citizens, radical right-wing groups, the Russian government, etc.; (c) is not woman- or gay-friendly themselves, or not truly supporting these issues. The second type of counter frame directly attacks the party or their leaders for (a) generalizing Islam/Muslims in regard to their position on women and gay issues and (b) being sexist, misogynist, or homophobic.

Figure 11: Critique on FvD and PVV by online followers of the parties

![Figure 11](image)

Note: numbers represent count
As figure 11 shows, the first type of counter frame is more often applied to PVV, while the accusation of being sexist, misogynist, or homophobic is more often applied to FvD and its leader Thierry Baudet. Also here, the fact that frame 1 ('rhetorical tool') and 4 ('generalizing Islam') are only used against PVV is not surprising considering the parties focus on Islam, while FvD rarely mentions Islam or Muslims in their Facebook posts. Let’s look at a few examples to illustrate the differences between these frames.

‘A lot of gays laugh about you Geert. Isn’t it too obvious that you want to use them for your dirty business? When have you ever given them any protection in word and deed? Right! Only if you can attack Muslims with it. With friends like you, you don’t need enemies, honey’ (#563, PVV).

In the claim above, PVV is framed as ‘hypocritical’, since it only employs women or gay issues to attack Islam or Muslims. In addition, this argument is underpinned by suggesting that PVV does not support gays or gay-issue in practice.

‘This is the most disrespectful post I’ve seen in a while. Wow. One could say the same thing about Christianity, since it is Christian beliefs that have held western society back from true progress for so long (gay marriage, women’s reproductive rights)” (#942, PVV). | ‘[…] You have a terrible hate towards Islam, you want to malign it. Everything you do serves that goal, as if the problems of gay’s interest you. Your ultra right-wing friends in America are not averse to some queer-bashing […]’ (#882, PVV).

Here, PVV is framed as ‘hypocritical’ because it ignores the fact that other groups, such as Christians, also reject homosexuality or (certain) woman’s rights, while only Islam is criticized. In practice, online followers provide a whole range of examples of other groups that are against (certain) women and gay issues, including far right groups that are supposedly connected to PVV, such as in the second example.

‘Where is the picture in which Geert walks hand in hand with his homophobic adviser and fundraiser Paul Belien? Or is that a sensitive subject for his conservative sponsors? Is that perhaps the reason PVV didn’t join the COC-debate and the rainbow-agreement? Or why PVV didn’t submit or support any pro-gay resolution since 2012?’ (#864, PVV)

This example illustrates the framing of PVV as ‘hypocritical’ since the party, or representatives thereof, are not women- or gay-friendly themselves. In addition, as in other examples above, the fact that PVV has not supported concrete gay-friendly agreements or resolutions is employed to underpin this argument.
Other claims directly attack or criticize both parties rather than framing it as ‘hypocritical’. As explained, an example of this second type of counter frame is, first of all, the critique that PVV generalizes Muslims in their position on women and gay issues. See for example the following statements:

‘This is the Quran of Geert Wilders, not of Islam. In Islam, women are equal to men! More than that, women got the right on property around 1400 in Islam. This right is given to women in Europe around 1900. Islam is ahead when it comes to women's rights. […]’ (#106, PVV).

‘Hi Geert. I come from a Muslim family and I had a gay Christian Dutch au pair. And a Jewish surrogate father. In London. In Den Haag. I am more secular than you. I am probably more educated than you. Would you like to put your money where your mouth is and join me in a debate in the debate society of your choice?’ (#82, PVV).

The first two statements argue that Geert Wilders is generalizing Islam and Muslims on women's rights and wrongfully represents them as ‘backwards’ by countering his claims with another, more progressive image of Islam and Muslims. These examples illustrate a more factual argumentation in which historical data or verses from the Quran are employed to prove Geert Wilders wrong. In the other two statements, personal experiences are used as examples of how PVV statements on Islam or Muslims constitute a selective and obscure picture that does not cover progressive interpretations and lifestyles of Islam and Muslims.

Indeed, these critical analyses by PVV followers conclude that PVV and Geert Wilders ignore, or even obstruct the potentiality of Islam or Muslims to be modern and progressive. Which is not surprising from the perspective of the party, since it legitimates the exclusion of Islam and Muslims from Dutch society based on the supposed incommensurability and incompatibility of Islamic and Dutch culture.

Another way PVV and FvD are attacked by their online followers, is by framing the party or their representatives as ‘sexist’, ‘misogynist’ or ‘homophobic’. Especially FvD and its leader Thierry Baudet are subject to this counter-framing, as the following examples reveal:

‘[…] only the remarks on women by this man carry a huge stigma, that makes me doubt this remarks also’ (#26, FvD). | [Shares a link with the title ‘Misogynistic pick-up's with Thierry Baudet’] ‘I found this!!!! Wauw, now i'm in doubt again’ (#740, FvD).

‘Do they have candidates left, since all the liars, sexists and homophobes are removed from the list? Now the fascist’ (#662, FvD). | ‘What an idiots! Racist, homophobic, gloomy club with a gloss of so-called intellect. BARF!’ (#946, FvD).

Most critique on Thierry Baudet is based on his controversial remarks on women, that are related to his books and to his connection with Julien Blanc—the equally controversial pick-up artist. The
first example relies on these associations and illustrates how Thierry Baudet is framed as women-unfriendly or a misogynist. The second set of examples illustrates how multiple frames are combined. Here, FvD or Thierry Baudet is framed as ‘sexist’ and ‘homophobic’, as well as ‘fascist’ and ‘racist’. In these counter-frames, PVV and FvD and their representatives are criticized because they hold conservative ideas on particular gender and sexuality issues, such as on the position of women or homosexuality. This is more in line with the conservative-progressive discourse, which will be discussed in depth in the following section.
5.2 The conservative backlash

My analysis of the comments corroborates the theoretical expectation that the ‘cultural backlash’ can also be explicitly conservative in nature, in line with the conservative–progressive discourse. Progressiveness in general yields a conservative response and becomes an ‘easy’ target in many claims of PVV or FvD followers. Here, progressiveness includes a wide range of actors (e.g. environmental activists, Social Justice Warriors and feminists), issues (e.g. feminism, transgenderism, anti-discrimination, political correctness) and policies (e.g. gender equality or neutrality policy). When looking at the amount of claims that contain negative sentiments towards progressive actors, issues or policies, FvD followers are clearly more critical towards what I summarized as ‘progressiveness’ (count: FvD = 36; PVV = 11).

Although this critique is aimed at a broad range of progressive actors, issues and policies, feminism and feminist issues are often mentioned. In addition, instead of appropriating, using or accepting liberal ideas on gender and sexuality, as is the case with the anti-Islam and anti-immigration claims that were discussed previously, these claims constitute a conservative, heteronormative and sometimes hostile response to particular gender issues: transgenderism, gender neutrality and more diverse gender identities. I will start with the first and analyze the framing of feminism and feminist issues in the claims of PVV and FvD followers.

5.2.1 The aversion towards feminism and gender equality

I first take a closer look at how feminists, feminism and feminist issues are discussed, and how they are embedded in anti-progressive claims. Let’s look at some examples.

‘Men come from Mars and women from Venus. A much-discusses book. The problem is, that currently we have many men who try one’s utmost to prove they are also from Venus. Thierry, you are still a Mars man’ (#244, FvD). | ‘VOC, that were real men… now we have feminized fags’ (#157, FvD). | ‘[…] Men that seem to become feminists, while they are men. That needs a new label. I would say: The Wet Towel Movement. […]’ (#177).

These claims illustrate how Dutch society is framed as ‘feminizing’, which is a problem according to some FvD followers. This ‘feminizing’ trend, that consists of men getting involved in feminism, is associated with the idea of ‘losing masculinity’. The type of masculinity that is supposedly lost, relies on stereotypical and conservative images of manhood—see how icons such as ‘Mars’ or the ‘VOC’ are mentioned in the claims above. These are examples of nostalgic imagery, referring to a time when men were ‘real men’, which is apparently in sharp contrast to the ‘feminized men’ of today. Underlying these expressions is the ancient man–woman dichotomy, based on the
assumption of an innate difference between men and women—which, so it is argued in increasingly explicit ways in radical right milieux’s, determines the suitability for particular roles in life. Based on this constructed opposition between men and woman, feminism is presented as irreconcilable with men’s interests—‘men that...become feminists, while they are men’. Moreover, this type of framing positions feminists as the ‘enemy’ (see for example the association between ‘feminists’ and ‘bullying’ in claim).

In addition, my findings show that feminism is embedded in claims that address political correctness, just like transgenderism and gender neutrality policy. In these claims, feminism and feminist policies are framed as addressing ‘fake problems’, and of ‘censoring’ or ‘distraction’ from what is really important. Thus, ‘politically correct’ appears to be a flexible label that is used to discredit feminism.

Besides aversive sentiments towards feminism, there are also conservative claims regarding gender roles and gender equality at work or in politics. This includes the framing of women as not suitable for ‘mens jobs’; women as not serious enough for making political decisions; and the idea that gender inequality in work or politics is due to women’s personal choice. As figure 13 shows, also here, FvD followers employ these frames much more than those of PVV.
The following examples illustrate how these three frames are employed in the claims of FvD followers—who I will focus on here, since they employ these particular frames much more than PVV followers. I will start by looking at claims in which traditional gender roles are promoted when it comes to work or politics. These claims address women in the military and in politics—both fields in which men have traditionally outnumbered women.


‘All women should leave the second chamber. Name me one that shows common sense. Bunch of place-hunters’ (882, FvD). | ‘I wonder if Ollongren would have become minister if she wasn’t a lesbian and a woman? […]’ (889, FvD).

‘At some fields, men have more aptitude than women. This kind of remarks were considered common sense 50 years ago, but currently have to be defended tooth and nail against the radical equality-knights’ (#866, FvD).

The first set of statements address women in the military, which is stereotypically considered a men’s field. These claims concur with that idea by framing working as a soldier, or in the military in general, as predetermined for men (‘it is men’s work’), and simultaneously rejecting the possibility that women can successfully hold a position in the military (‘doesn’t work anyway’). Furthermore, these claims demonstrate how the assumption of innate differences between men and women determines the fitness for particular jobs, in this case the military (see for example the first claim).

In addition, the use of expletives is worthy of mentioning, since it indicates an emotional interest in the subject matter. Perhaps, the assumed naturalness—in this case, of the military being a men’s field—that is challenged by women’s presence, is invoking anger and the fear of ‘losing’ one’s privileged position, as suggested by the backlash theory.

Also politics is considered best entrusted to men, as the second set of examples reveals. Especially the perceived ‘incapability’ of women to fulfill a governing position is emphasized here: they are framed as lacking ‘common sense’ and responsible for ‘big mistakes’. A phrase like ‘place-hunters’ illustrates the idea that positive discrimination, rather than competence, puts (certain) women in high positions. Underlying these expressions is, subconsciously, an idea of entitlement: women ‘stealing’ jobs that are ‘intended’ for men. The last claim reveals explicitly how this entitlement is legitimated: men and women are framed as having innate qualities (‘aptitude’) that constitute a difference (‘at some fields…more aptitude than’), which ‘naturally’ determines the suitability for certain jobs (it is ‘common sense’), or roles in life. In this claim, this ‘naturalness’ is supposedly challenged by ‘radical equality-knight’—possibly meaning people promoting (policies aimed at) gender equality.
5.2.2 Negative sentiments on transgenderism and gender neutrality

Finally, I will discuss claims of online followers that mention particular gender issues: transgenderism, gender neutrality and more diverse gender identities. Besides feminism and gender equality, also these gender issues are subject to conservative critique. Figure 14 depicts the frequency of negative gender claims by FvD and PVV followers and the specific framing of these issues. In line with the previous findings on claims regarding ‘progressiveness’ in general, also regarding these progressive gender issues, FvD followers more often express a negative view. I will discuss each frame and provide examples.

Figure 14: Negative gender claims addressing transgenderism, gender neutrality or more diverse gender identities

The issues transgenderism, gender neutrality and diverse gender identities are framed as a non-issue, which implies politics shouldn’t be concerned with it. This frame frequently cooccurs with the framing of these issues as only of interest to a small minority—being transgenders, or ‘leftists’—which is presented as an argument for the first frame. See the following statements:

‘All that politically correct nonsense makes me sick. Now its gender neutral! What a bullshit. [...] But no… we shouldn’t worry about a hand full of people that does not fit the labels ‘ladies’ or ‘gentlemen’. Just what are we doing! Worry about the groups of deprived terrorists that come into out county […]’(502, FvD).
‘What’s wrong with referenda? Listen to the voice of the people! Look what happens with our “democratic” Netherlands. 0,29% of the population is transgender, and all sorts of measures are taken. A hand full of people is against Black Pete, and the tradition seems to disappear’ (627, FVD).

The first claim reveals how gender neutrality is framed as a non-issue, or ‘bullshit’. This issue is strongly connected to transgenderism or more diverse gender identities, since gender neutral policy, according to PVV or FvD followers, is aimed at those who do not fit the ‘man’ or ‘woman’ box—of which transgenders are the most common example. Both claims illustrate how the trivialness of these issues and policies is substantiated: on the one hand, by emphasizing the minority status of these groups, being transgenders or non-binary people, and on the other, by pointing to other issues that are worthy of political attention (e.g. ‘terrorism’). These claims illustrate how, besides feminism, also progressive gender issues are associated with political correctness—which turns out to be a highly effective vehicle to mark, discredit and delegitimize a broad range of progressive actors, issues and policies aimed at equality in terms of race, gender and sexual preference.

Gender neutrality, transgenderism and diverse gender identities are also framed as ‘unnatural’, which is another way to trivialize these issues in a political sense, and a more fundamental approach to rejects and delegitimizes the idea of diverse or flexible gender identities all together. See for example the following claim:

‘I’m not getting started on this totally nonsensical discussion on gender neutrality. For Gods sake, for that hand full of people, a men’s and a ladies’ room should be sufficient, isn’t it? […] ‘Boy’ or ‘girl’ is not a “feeling” you wake up with all of a sudden, that is determined biologically. But yes, in the philosophy of ‘social engineering’, even that line is not sacred anymore […]’ (#69, FvD).

This claim illustrated how gender is perceived as linked to biological sex, in the sense that the latter is determinative of the former. This biological determinism is opposed to ‘social engineering’, most likely referring to social constructionist ideas that inform fluid conceptions of gender, and question what is often conceived as natural (and as such, ‘sacred’; not to be challenged). Based on the ‘naturalness’ of the sex-gender link, gender neutrality policy is discredited and delegitimized by framing it as ‘nonsensical’.

In addition, transgenderism and gender neutrality is associated with ‘indecisiveness’ and ‘incompetence’, and opposed to masculinity. This framing is used in playful claims that often address politicians of established parties, as the following examples indicate.
‘They have no balls... those transgenders’ (790, FvD). | [About the prime minister] 'Our genderless wally is not capable of that, he rather gives the whole EU a blowjob!!' (599, FvD). | ‘Could Rutte be a transgender? The man is womanish, and his actions are weak […]’ (583, PVV). | ‘Gender neutral, or: not able to make choices. That fits D66. I'm so sick of that so called political correctness, in order to win votes […]’ (519, PVV).

Having balls, as an icon of having guts and vigor, and of masculinity, is used in contrast to non-binary gender identities and transgenderism, that become icons of 'incapability', 'indecisiveness' and 'weakness'. This framing is then used to discredit established politicians, and especially prime minister Mark Rutte is a target. These specific associations fit the overall pattern of negative sentiments in respect to progressive gender issues that has been outlined in this section.

In the following chapter, the conclusion and discussion, I will connect the findings and analyses on negative gender claims in this section, with those on women's and gay issues in the previous section, and the quantitative findings in the first results-chapter.
6. Conclusion and discussion

Although the party leaders of PVV and FvD mention gender and sexuality issues in policy proposals, public debates and on social media, up until now, studies did not focus on whether their online followers discuss these issues, and how salient they are compared to other issues that are often associated with these parties: anti-elitism (which is about established politics, both left- and right-wing) and nativism (which is about immigration and Islam). This matter is addressed by the first research question on the salience of gender and sexuality issues.

The results revealed that, compared to the issues that are most often associated with the populist radical right, nativism and anti-elitism, issues of gender and sexuality get least attention in the comments of PVV and FvD followers. This is constant over time, which indicates that of the three issue tested here, gender and sexuality is least salient, and it is not a main issue for online followers of both parties. FvD followers clearly discuss the anti-elitism issue the most, while PVV followers focus more on nativism. Furthermore, the other part of the first research phase indicated that a relationship exists between the issues nativism and gender and sexuality. Attention for these issues per week follows a similar pattern, which is confirmed by the calculated correlation. Also in the semantic network, links between these issues are found, sometimes directly pointing to a ‘liberal’ Islam/immigration critique, although, based on the semantic network this is difficult to determine.

The second and third phase of this study were designed to develop a profound understanding of the structure and nature of gender and sexuality claims of PVV and FvD followers, which is done by analyzing the frames that are being used. This provides an answer to the second research question.

First, I looked at the main difference between online followers of both parties in terms of the framing of gender and sexuality issues. These findings are consistent with what the first research phase revealed. Regarding PVV followers, the attention for the issues per week indicated a focus on the nativist issue, and the semantic network revealed what I named a ‘nationalistic cluster’, indicating a focus on the nation and national norms and values. The frame analysis and manual content analysis revealed that the framing of women’s issues (including women’s emancipation and rights and gender equality) and gay issues (including the acceptance of homosexuality and gay rights) by PVV followers is strongly connected to Islam and immigration, and to concepts of ‘nation’, therefore confirming a ‘liberal’ Islam/immigration critique. This type of framing is dominant in comments of PVV followers, who employ these frames much more than those of FvD. The connection between the attention for the nativist and gender and sexuality issue over
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time, as found in the first research phase, is thus corroborated in the second and third research phase. Moreover, based on the frame analysis and manual content analysis, I concluded that women’s and gay issues are so firmly embedded in anti-Islam and anti-immigration rhetoric, that they are exclusively mentioned in this context, never independently.

The ‘liberal’ Islam/immigration critique, which is more often used by PVV followers, includes the framing of Muslim and immigrant men as violent aggressors, while women (both native Dutch and Muslim) and gays are framed as victims. In addition, Islam is framed as backwards with regard to woman’s emancipation and gay rights, and endangering these ‘liberal’ values—a threat that is often expressed by pointing to Islamization as the main source of decline in Dutch society.

This critique is also used against established politics: their position towards Islam, Muslims or immigrants is framed as a betrayal of Dutchness. Online followers of PVV also use these particular frames more often.

Regarding FvD followers, the attention for the three issues per week indicated a focus on the anti-elitism issue, which is about established politics, and in the semantic network I identified a ‘politics cluster’ containing many references to established parties or their representatives. This cluster is connected to issues of homosexuality and gay rights. In line with these findings, the frame analysis and manual content analysis revealed that the framing of women’s and gay issues by FvD followers is more often connected to established politics. While PVV followers more often use a ‘liberal’ Islam/immigration critique to attack established politics, the main critique of FvD followers on established politics is based on their supposed hypocrisy in regard to women and gay issues, and does not directly involve Islam. FvD followers also overwhelmingly point to ‘the Left’ as responsible for the decline of Dutch society.

Furthermore, FvD followers differ from those of PVV in their expressions on progressive issues, actors and policies: they more often express negative opinions. This includes negative claims on progressive gender issues such as transgenderism, gender neutrality and more diverse gender identities, as well as negative claims on feminists or feminism. Also they more often express conservative ideas on women at work or in politics.

In general, we can conclude that PVV and FvD followers differ mainly on a structural level, in terms of what issues and actors they focus on in their critique, while the nature of the frames they employ, meaning how issues or actors are framed, is comparable.

Second, I looked at differences between the framing of particular gender and sexuality issues in the claims of PVV and FvD followers. Here, a distinction can be made between women and gay issues on the one hand, and progressive gender issues and feminism on the other hand.

The first set of issues are appropriated and ‘defended’, but as we have seen, only in an anti-Islam/immigration context. Women’s and gay issues function as a way to problematize Muslim and
immigrant men, which involves simultaneously marking them as different, and framing them as a violent threat. Islam is problematized by framing it as backwards with regard to women and gay issues, and a threat for the preservation of these liberal values. Marking Islam and muslims as different happens through what I called a *discriminatory utilization*, which means that women’s and gay issues are explicitly or implicitly associated with ‘Dutch’ or ‘Dutch values’, and opposed to ‘Islam’ and ‘Islamic values’. Thus, these issues mark a difference between ‘Dutch’ (meaning native) and ‘Non-Dutch’ (meaning non-native and Islamic) in terms of a supposed position on women’s and gay issues.

Despite differences in the framing of native Dutch women and gays on the one hand, and Muslim women on the other, both are subject to a *victimization* in which framing creates a one-dimensional reality that does not acknowledges women and gays as subjects, but reduces them to their victimhood, which serves the anti-Islam or anti-immigration agenda. In claims of PVV and FvD followers, women and gays, as well as the issues that concern them, enable the framing of Islam/Muslims and immigrants in particular ways (e.g. as ‘dangerous’ or ‘backwards’)—based on which they are employed to discriminate between ‘Dutch’ (meaning native) and ‘Non-Dutch’ (meaning non-native and Islamic).

Hence, defending woman and gays, and issues that are of interest to them, provides a malleable narrative that, on the one hand, enables a discriminatory utilization, marking a difference between Islamic and Dutch culture, and on the other hand, functions as a stick to beat Muslims, but also left wing politics or the radical right (depending on the context), for endangering/threatening/assaulting/disrespecting, etc., woman and gays, or women and gay-issues. Despite the seemingly noble character of these claims, the analysis presented indicates that these issues mainly serve to discriminate/demarcate/differentiate between a certain ‘us’ and ‘them’, and to discredit/criticize/attack, etc., particular ‘enemies’. In other words, that ‘defending’ women and gays, and women and gay issues, is not the goal in itself but a vehicle to achieve another goal—as such, in claims of PVV and FvD followers, they are a means to an end, never an end in itself.

The second set of issues, being feminism and progressive gender issues such as transgenderism, gender neutrality and more diverse gender identities, invoke negative sentiments. The framing of these issues constitutes a conservative response to progressive issues, as described in the theoretical chapter. Negative framing of progressive gender issues is aimed to trivialize these issues and related policies, which is done by emphasizing the minority status of these groups (being transgenders or non-binary people), and by pointing to other issues that are worthy of political attention (e.g. ‘terrorism’). Feminism is framed as responsible for the ‘feminizing’ of society, which is associated with ‘losing masculinity’. As such, feminism is presented as irreconcilable with men’s interests, and feminists are framed as the ‘enemy’. In addition, some claims express conservative ideas on women at work or in politics. Underlying these anti-progressive claims is a perceived
naturalness: of differences between men and women, their aptitude for particular jobs or roles in
life, and of the link between sex and gender. Issues or actors that challenge this 'naturalness', are
subject to negative sentiments.

In sum: the differences in the framing of gender and sexuality issues yields an inconsistent and
paradoxical image. On the one hand, in line with the civilized-backward discourse, women's issues
(being women's emancipation and rights and gender equality) and gay issues (being the acceptance
of homosexuality and gay rights) are 'defended', while on the other hand, in line with the
conservative-progressive discourse, feminism, and in particular contexts also gender equality (for
example when women work in a field that is perceived as a 'mens field'), are criticized or attacked.
In addition, also transgenders are criticized and gender neutral policy is framed as a non-issue.

The paradoxical nature of the findings is theoretically explainable. While many claims at a first
glance contain 'liberal' and modern aspect by means of appropriating women's and gay issues—
which enables a particular framing of Dutch and Islamic culture—they are at the same time
rejecting the idea of progress, as Oudenampsen (2018) suggests. Implicitly, the claims of PVV and
FvD followers present woman's emancipation and homo-acceptance as complete. These issues
become solid and rigid; a state rather than ongoing processes. This is in line with McRobbies
(2004) analysis that the suggestion that 'equality is achieved' is strategically employed to discredit
the broader feminist claims and a renewal of feminist politics. The solid and complete state of
woman's emancipation and homo-acceptance serves the anti-Islam/immigration argument, since it
precludes the possibility of imperfection and any form of self-critique regarding Dutch culture (for
example, that there is room for improving gender equality and the acceptance of homosexuality in
the Netherlands), and legitimizes the rhetoric chasm between Dutch and Islamic culture in terms
of women's and gay issues. Therefore, the 'liberal' Islam/immigration critique of online followers
contradicts the idea of progress and emancipation, because it strategically constrains it, which
makes it fundamentally conservative (in the situational sense), not liberal. The labels 'liberal'
nativists and 'liberal' Islam/immigration critique as used by Spierings et al., (2015) and in this
report are therefore somewhat misleading, although the quotation marks indicate 'supposedly
liberal', not actually liberal.

Furthermore, the findings corroborate the theory on a backlash against feminism. As
Oudenampsen (2018, p. 173) argued, the Dutch conservative response 'incorporates the more
moderate and generally accepted forms of women's emancipation, in order to be able to more
effectively resist the broader claims of the feminist movement as outdated and defunct'. The
findings clearly show, on the hand hand, the 'defense' of woman's emancipation, and on the other,
the critique on feminism as a movements and its influence on Dutch society.
6.1 Implications of this study

The analysis of online conversations or messages has a few important implications, the first in respect to the nature of online mediums. Herring (2004) states online behavior can differ, depending on the specific medium and situation. In the same vein, the interpersonal deception theory (Buller & Burgoon, 1996) states that individuals are sensitive to minor differences in online contexts, which determines the amount and the nature of information that users of online platforms provide. They attune shared information to the expected audience and the functionality of the online context (Emanuel et al., 2014). Therefore the effect of the nature of online mediums on (online) social behavior will have to be acknowledged in the interpretation of the findings.

A second implication involves the question whether online messages or statements of online followers, represent the supporter base of radical right parties or social movements. After addressing this methodological issue, Muis et al. (n.d.) suggest that ‘[t]he most straightforward solution to this methodological challenge is to simply avoid any claim that online samples of Facebook followers represent the offline supporter base of these far right movements and parties’. However, this is not necessarily a weakness, since online discussions constitute a reality in their own right and are therefore a valuable source of data and object of study (Ibid.).

A third implication involves sampling, and whether the sample is representative of all online followers of PVV and FvD, since studies show that only a small minority of online users post comments in political discussions, while the majority are ‘lurkers’ who only read the content (Stromer-Galley, 2014). In addition, studies reveal that in online political discussions, mainly men are active (Ibid.). Despite these implications, looking at comments of online followers of PVV and FvD might be valuable, since the content posted by a small, active minority, can influence the opinion of the ‘lurkers’ that are reading.

6.2 Suggestions for further research

I will conclude this report with some suggestions for further research. First of all, the younger party, FvD, was more negative on progressive gender issues and feminism, and focussed less on the ‘defense’ of particular gender & sexuality issues, compared to PVV. Further research is needed to better understand opposition to progressive gender issues, to see whether and to what extent it is mainstreaming, and whether it constitutes a long-term trend.

Considering the changing nature of the radical right, as a globalized and layered phenomenon (Maly, 2018), future research that aims to better understand the nature and impact of radical right ideas regarding gender and sexuality, could also include radical right movements and online communities, and analyze these collective actors in a transnational context.
In order to gain more in-depth insights into the meaning of gender and sexuality issues for nativist online communities, future studies could employ methods of netnography, which aims to understand online communities by actively participating for a longer period of time, which will yield a valuable insider-perspective.
Appendix

A1.0 Remarks on ethics and data management

In the collection of online data, important ethical concerns need to be acknowledged. These concerns differ greatly from the ethical issues that arise from more traditional forms of data collection and analysis, such as conducting in-depth interviews or surveys.

In respect to online research, Pace and Livingston (2005) offer multiple guidelines on how to conduct ethical research online. However, these are not without problems. For example, whether online material can be labeled ‘sensitive’ is a difficult judgment that will differ from person to person (Bryman, 2012). Furthermore, whether data is ‘public’ or ‘private’ is not self-evident and therefore debatable.

Therefore, in addition to the guidelines of Pace and Livingston (2005), considerations that are suggested by the Association of Internet Researchers (AoIR) can be helpful. Concerning the issue of ‘public’ or ‘private’ content, the AoIR suggests a researcher to ask: is the conversation, thread or forum perceived as public or private by the authors themselves? (Markham, 2012). These kind of questions can help a researcher to make an ethical decision when selecting and sampling the data.

In order to decide whether data is ‘sensitive’, the AoIR suggest a researcher to consider the following: is the data easily searchable or retrievable? And in addition: if messages or comments of a subject would become known outside the specific website, Facebook group or forum-website, ‘would harm likely result?’ (Markham, 2012).

Another problem that arises with online research, is that of informed consent. As Muis et al. (n.d.) point out, asking for informed consent can be difficult for practical reasons, since the dataset can include many people—as will be the case with the dataset for this study. It can be argued, as Bryman (2012, p. 149) does, that when ‘postings are in the public domain’ there is no obligation to ask for informed consent. Nonetheless, there will inevitably be datasources that are difficult to label ‘public’ or ‘private’. For the purpose of this study, I will therefore approach ‘public’ or ‘private’ as a continuum, on which the most public data are posts, messages or comments that are posted on public websites and are easy to access. I consider the comments that are used for this study, posted on a public Facebook page with thousands of followers, to be ‘public’.

Aside from the public/private issue, it is essential that data (whether posts, messages or comments) cannot be linked to a person, thus, that the data contains solely anonymous posts, messages or comments. By working with Facebook’s API, scraping comments will inevitably yield data that is anonymous and cannot be traced back to a person.

I will conclude this section with a few remarks on data-storage. During the research (from the first dataset until the final report is graded), I will store the data on an external hard-drive and on my personal iCloud-domain in order to prevent that the dataset gets lost or damaged due to technical problems. After this period, I will remove the data from my iCloud-domain and save a copy on an external hard-drive. Furthermore, the final report will be stored at local servers of the Vrije Universiteit, up until ten years after the completion of this research project.
A2.0 Keywords in search-queries

(First research phase) Dictionary search:


(Second and third research phase) Selecting gender and sexuality comments:


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